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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 





Schwan's Home Service, Inc. and 
The Schwan Food Company,
Defendants.
Mark G. Stephenson, Esq. and Stephenson & Sutcliffe, PA, 
1635 Greenview Drive S.W., Rochester, MN 55902, counsel 
for plaintiff.
Alan L. Rupe, Esq., Douglas W. Peters, Esq., Jason D. 
Stitt, Esq. and Kutak Rock LLP, 1605 North Waterfront 
Parkway, Suite 150, Wichita, KS 67206, counsel for 
defendants.
This matter is before the court upon the motion for summary 
judgment by defendants Schwan's Home Service, Inc. and The Schwan 
Food Company (collectively, Schwan's). Based on a review of the 
file, record and proceedings herein, and for the following reasons, 
the court grants the motion.
This employment dispute arises out of the termination of 
plaintiff Jeff Knutson by Schwan's in February 2009. Through its 
various entities, Schwan's manufactures frozen foods in several 
states, then transports those products to regional distribution 
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deliver the products to consumers, using delivery trucks with a 
gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of between 10,001 and 26,000 
pounds.
Knutson began working for Schwan's in 1998 and was promoted to 
district general manager in 2005. In May 2007, Schwan's terminated 
Knutson because "his region was moving in a different direction." 
Knutson Dep. 88:16-89:2. Schwan's rehired Knutson in July 2007 as 
the location general manager of the Zumbrota, Minnesota depot. 
Thereafter, the depot became more productive.
Knutson's employment was conditioned upon his meeting the 
standards of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)1 and 
Schwan's for motor-vehicle records, physical examination and 
functional-capacity testing. The position description requires 
location general managers to meet DOT "eligibility requirements, 
including appropriate driver's license and corresponding medical 
certification." Id. Ex. 20. Schwan's policy states that "when an 
injury can affect the DOT status or medical status or health 
status, at that point ... a DOT employee needs to seek out medical 
attention and see if they can obtain a medical card." See Hunstad 
Dep. 39:21-40:5; Evert Dep. 29:21-31:10.
The DOT requires a person to be medically certified to operate 
a commercial motor vehicle, or obtain a medical variance from the 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. 49 C.F.R.
1 All references to the DOT in this order are to the U.S. DOT.
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§ 391.41(a)(1), (a)(3). To be certified, a person must have
distant visual acuity of at least 20/40 — or corrected to at least 
20/40 — in each eye, distant binocular acuity of at least 20/40 
using both eyes, a horizontal field of vision of at least 70 
degrees in each eye and the ability to distinguish the colors of 
traffic signals. Id. § 391.41(b)(10). A person must renew the 
medical examiner's certificate every 24 months or whenever the 
"ability to perform his/her normal duties has been impaired by a 
physical or mental injury or disease." Id. § 391.45.
When he began work as a location general manager, Knutson was 
DOT qualified and had obtained a medical-examiner's certificate 
valid through July 2009. At first, he drove delivery trucks as 
part of training and managing the staff at Zumbrota. According to 
Knutson, he last drove a delivery truck for Schwan's on November 7, 
2007. Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n 1, 3. But see Knutson Dep. 295:5-15.2
Thereafter, when he delivered products for Schwan's, he used his 
personal car. Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n 3.
In March 2008, Knutson suffered a penetrating eye injury. 
Following surgery, he reported to his supervisor, Jed Hunstad, that 
his prognosis ranged from having no vision in the affected eye to 
20/20 vision. Ultimately, Knutson had three surigical procedures, 
each involving injection of a bubble into his eye to stabilize his
2 For purposes of this motion, the court assumes that Knutson 
did not drive a Schwan's delivery truck after November 7, 2007.
3
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retina. While the bubbles were present, the outcome of each 
procedure was uncertain. Hoping that Knutson would recover, 
Hunstad did not report the injury to human resources. Hunstad Dep. 
29:5-33:1.
In late 2008, Hunstad reported the injury to Roger Evert in
human resources. Id. at 34:21-35:4. According to Knutson,
Schwan's sent him to a local clinic for a fitness-for-duty exam,
and the doctor referred Knutson for further consultation. As a
result, the second doctor concluded:
Uncorrected vision in each eye is 20/20 in the 
right at distance; 20/400 at distance in the 
left, 20/15 both together. Corrected vision 
shows the right eye to have 20/15 vision, the 
left eye 20/200 vision at distance. Near 
vision is 20/25 with both eyes together. A 
full field 120 point screening visual field 
test was given today. His right eye shows 
normal fields. Left eye shows depression on 
temporal aspect and inferior aspect causing 
decreased fields in these areas limiting his 
field to approximately 60 to 70 degrees ....
Knutson Dep. Ex 11. The doctor further opined that Knutson "has
exceptionally good vision in his right eye and reasonably wide
visual fields using both eyes together" and that he "would be safe
to operate a motor vehicle." Id. The doctor did not, however,
give Knutson a medical-examiner's certificate or waiver.3 Knutson
told Hunstad about his results.
3 Knutson admits that he was not qualified 
because his left-eye vision was less than 20/40. 
143:15-17.
or a certificate 
See Knutson Dep.
4
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Schwan's notified Knutson that due to his injury, he would be 
placed on a 30-day leave in which to obtain a new medical- 
examiner's certificate or apply for non-DOT-qualified positions 
within Schwan's. Knutson Dep. Ex. 14. During his leave, Knutson 
did not visit a physician to seek a medical-examiners certificate 
or secure a waiver. Id. at 30:13-34:1; 47:3-48:14. Knutson 
applied for two positions within Schwan's, but was not offered the 
positions. Id. at 34:2-13. Evert contacted Knutson shortly before 
the 30-day period ended because he had not heard from Knutson. 
Evert Dep. 85:9-863; Knutson Dep. 260:15-18. Knutson replied that 
there was nothing with which Evert could assist him. Knutson Dep. 
276:14-277:2. On February 9, 2009, Schwan's terminated Knutson's 
employment.
Knutson filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission. After receiving a right-to-sue 
letter, Knutson timely filed the present action in Minnesota court. 
Knutson claims disability discrimination in violation of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Minnesota Human 
Rights Act (MHRA), breach of contract and failure to pay wages upon 
discharge in violation of Minnesota Statutes § 181.13. Schwan's 
removed and now moves for summary judgment.
5
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DISCUSSION
The court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(a). A fact is material only when its resolution affects the 
outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that 
it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either 
party. See id. at 252.
The court views all evidence and inferences in a light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. See id. at 255. The nonmoving 
party must set forth specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine 
issue for trial; that is, the nonmoving party "must do more than 
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the 
material facts." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 
U.S. 133, 150 (2000); see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50; Celotex v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Moreover, if a plaintiff cannot 
support each essential element of his claim, the court must grant 
summary judgment, because a complete failure of proof regarding an 
essential element necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
I. Disability Discrimination
The ADA and MHRA prohibit employers from discriminating 
against individuals on the basis of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112;
6
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Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subdiv. 2. The court analyzes ADA and MHRA 
claims under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Dovenmuehler v. St. Cloud 
Hosp., 509 F.3d 435, 439 n.4 (8th Cir. 2007).4 To establish a 
prima facie case of disability discrimination, a plaintiff must 
show that (1) he was disabled; (2) he was qualified to perform the 
essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable 
accommodation; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action due 
to his disability. See Burchett v. Target Corp., 340 F.3d 510, 516 
(8th Cir. 2003).
Congress amended the ADA effective January 1, 2009, to 
"supersede the Supreme Court's prior admonitions to consider the 
ameliorative effects of mitigating measures ... and to construe 
narrowly the ADA's 'substantially limits' language" when 
determining whether a person is disabled. Kirkeberg v. Canadian 
Pac. Ry., 619 F.3d 898, 904 n.2 (8th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted) 
(applying version of ADA prior to 2008 amendments); see also ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 
3553-54 (rejecting standard for "substantially disabled" as 
interpreted by Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. 
Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002)). The adverse employment action in 
the present action occurred after January 1, 2009, and therefore
4 Failure-to-accommodate claims are subject to a modified 
burden-shifting framework.
7
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the court addresses Knutson's claims under the amended Act and 
regulations.
A. Disability
The term "disability" means 1) a physical or mental impairment 
that substantially limits one or more major life activities, 2) a 
record of such impairment, or 3) being regarded as having such an 
impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1),-5 see also Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, 
subdiv. 12 (defining disabled person in terms of physical, sensory 
or mental impairment).6 There is no serious dispute that Knutson's 
injury is a physical impairment that affects the major life 
activity of seeing. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)-(i) (2011). The
parties disagree, however, about whether Knutson's impairment 
substantially limits his ability to see.
5 All references to the ADA are to the amended version of the
ADA.
6 The analysis of claims under the ADA and MHRA is the same, 
except that the MHRA applies a "materially-limiting" standard which 
was less stringent than the pre-amendment ADA standard of 
"substantially limiting." See Kirkeberg, 619 F.3d at 908 (citing 
Sigurdson v. Carl Bolander & Sons, Inc., 532 N.W.2d 225, 228 (Minn. 
1995)). Minnesota does not define "materially limiting" and uses 
federal antidiscrimination statutes for guidance. McLain v. 
Anderson Corp., 567 F.3d 956, 967 (8th Cir. 2009). The court does 
not determine how the Minnesota standard compares to the post­
amendment federal standard, because Knutson makes no argument that 
he might be materially limited rather than substantially limited. 
Therefore, the court analyzes the state and federal claims under 
the lower, amended ADA standard.
8
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"An impairment is a disability ... if it substantially limits 
the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as 
compared to most people in the general population." Id. 
§ 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). The standard for determining whether an
impairment substantially limits a major life activity is not 
demanding, and requires a lesser degree of limitation than the 
standard applied before the ADA Amendments Act. Id.
§ 1630.2(j)(1)(iv). Although an impairment "need not prevent, or 
significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing 
a major life activity ... not every impairment will constitute a 
disability...." Id. The court broadly construes the term 
"substantially limits" in favor of expansive coverage. Id. 
§ 1630.2(j)(1)(1).
The court performs an individualized assessment to determine 
whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity. 
Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i)(IV) (determination made without 
regard to learned behavioral or adaptive neurological
modifications); cf. Kirkeberg, 619 F.3d at 903-04. A plaintiff 
must show more than a "mere difference," but vision need not be 
"severely restrict[ed]" compared to that of an average individual. 
See Kirkeberg, 619 F.3d at 903; see also ADA Amendments Act of 2008 
§ 2(a)(7), (b)(4)-(5). A person with monocular vision "ordinarily
will meet the Act's definition of disability" but a plaintiff must 
produce evidence of a substantial loss to depth perception or
9
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visual acuity. Kirkeberg, 619 F.3d at 904 ("[A]n individualized
showing of a substantial limitation is essential because of the 
differences that exist between people with [monocular vision]."); 
see Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566-67 (1999). 
The court may not take mitigating measures into account other than 
ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(j)(1)(vi)
Schwan's argues that Knutson fails to provide evidence that he 
has a loss of depth perception or visual acuity. An optometrist 
who examined Knutson in December 2008 determined that he had 
uncorrected 20/15 vision at distance and corrected 20/25 near 
vision with reduced field of view in his left eye. Knutson Dep. 
Ex. 11. The optometrist stated that since Knutson "has
exceptionally good vision in his right eye and reasonably wide 
visual fields using both eyes together, he would be safe to operate 
a motor vehicle and perform[] safely on all driving tasks." Id. 
According to Knutson, he cannot wear corrective lenses because they 
cause double vision. Id. at 158:12-24. The evidence shows that 
although Knutson has anywhere from 20/150 to 20/80 vision in his 
left eye, his overall vision is excellent. There is no evidence 
that he lacks depth perception, and he continues to drive. In 
short, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Knutson, 
he fails to provide evidence from which a reasonable jury could 
find more than a mere difference in his vision compared to others.
10
CASE 0:10-cv-04823-DSD-TNL Document 28 Filed 04/27/12 Page 11 of 19
As a result, Knutson fails to show that he is substantially limited 
compared to most people in the general population. Therefore, 
Knutson has not shown that he is disabled for purposes of the ADA 
or MHRA, and summary judgment is warranted.
B. Essential Functions of the Job
Even assuming Knutson were disabled for purposes of the ADA 
and MHRA, summary judgment is also warranted because Knutson fails 
to show that he is qualified to perform the essential functions of 
the job of location general manager. Under the ADA, "[a]n 
individual is qualified if he satisfies the requisite skill, 
experience, education, and other job-related requirements and 'can 
perform the essential job functions, with or without reasonable 
accommodation.'" Rehrs v. Iams Co., 486 F.3d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 
2007) (quoting Cravens v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan. City, 
214 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 2000)). An employer bears the burden 
of showing that a particular function is essential. See Benson v. 
Nw. Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1113 (8th Cir. 1995). "Essential 
functions of the job are fundamental job duties, and the employer's 
judgment in this regard is considered highly probative." Duello v. 
Buchanan Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 628 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 
2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Schwans argues that being DOT qualified to drive delivery 
trucks was an essential function of the job of location general 
manager. Knutson responds that being DOT qualified was not an
11
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essential function of his job because the Zumbrota delivery 
vehicles do not operate in interstate commerce, the vehicles are 
not commercial motor vehicles, his job did not require him to drive 
delivery vehicles, and Schwan's could have accommodated him by 
allowing him not to drive delivery vehicles. The court addresses 
each argument.
1. Interstate Commerce
Knutson first argues that being DOT qualified to drive 
commercial vehicles was not an essential part of his duties because 
the vehicles do not operate in interstate commerce. In support, 
Knutson argues that Schwan's Home Service is only one of several 
related Schwan's entities, and that Schwan's Home Service operates 
only within the borders of Minnesota. In Guyton v. Schwan Food 
Co., this court addressed the question of interstate commerce and 
driving duties of location general managers in the context of the 
Motor Carrier Act exemption to the Fair Labor Standards Act. See 
No. 03-5523, 2004 WL 533942, at *4 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2004) (Frank, 
J.), aff'd, 125 F. App'x 84, 85 (8th Cir. 2005). The court finds 
the reasoning of Guyton persuasive. As in Guyton, the Schwan's 
entities manufacture products in several states and those products 
move rapidly through distribution centers and local depots to 
consumers. Schwan's has a "fixed and persistent intent" to ship 
and deliver its products in interstate commerce, and therefore, the 
"intrastate transport of Schwan food products is one leg of an
12
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interstate journey." Id. at *5. Therefore, Schwan's Home Service 
vehicles operate in interstate commerce, and Knutson's argument 
fails.
2. Commercial Motor Vehicles
Knutson next argues that DOT qualification to drive commercial 
motor vehicles is not an essential job function because the 
Zumbrota delivery vehicles are not commercial motor vehicles as 
defined by DOT regulations. Schwan's acknowledges that the 
regulations do not require a commercial driver's license (CDL) to 
operate the delivery vehicles, because the vehicles have a GVWR of 
less than 26,001 pounds. According to Schwan's, the delivery 
vehicles are nonetheless commercial motor vehicles under DOT 
regulations.
DOT regulations define a commercial motor vehicle as a vehicle 
with a GVWR of 10,001 pounds or more, "unless specifically defined 
elsewhere." 49 C.F.R. § 390.5. The section setting forth the CDL 
requirement defines commercial motor vehicle differently: the 
regulations only require a CDL for commercial motor vehicles that 
have a GVWR of more than 2 6, 001 pounds. See id. § 3 8 3.5. The 
definition of commercial motor vehicle for purposes of the CDL 
requirements, however, does not control other regulations. As a 
result, even if the DOT regulations do not require a CDL to operate
13
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the Zumbrota delivery vehicles, they are still commercial motor 
vehicles for other DOT purposes, such as a requiring a medical- 
examiner's certificate.
The physical-qualifications requirement for a medical- 
examiner's certificate applies to all commercial motor vehicles. 
See id. § 391.41(a). Indeed, the language of section 391.41 shows 
that the DOT intends for the physical and medical requirements to 
apply a larger class of commercial motor vehicles than those that 
require a CDL. See id. § 391.41(a)(2) (imposing different carrying 
requirements for medical-examiner's certificate for CDL drivers and 
non-CDL drivers). Thus Knutson's argument fails, and persons who 
drive Schwan's delivery trucks are subject to DOT physical and 
medical requirements.
3. Essential Functions
Knutson also argues that driving a delivery truck was not an 
essential function of his job as a location general manager. A 
function is essential when the position exists to perform that 
function, the function may be only performed by a limited number of 
employees or it requires special expertise. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(n)(2). In addition to the judgement of an employer, other 
evidence of essential functions includes written job descriptions, 
amount of time spent performing the function, consequences of not
14
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performing the function and current work experience of others in 
similar jobs. Id. § 1630.2(n)(3); Dropinski v. Douglas Cnty., 
Neb., 298 F.3d 704, 707 (8th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
According to Knutson, beginning months before his injury, and 
for over a year before his termination, he did not drive a Schwan's 
delivery truck as a location general manager. Instead he argues 
that he did not need to drive a truck as a location general manager 
because he had overstaffed the depot and he delivered Schwan's 
products in his personal vehicle. See Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n 3. But see 
Knutson Dep. 290:5-21. Moreover, Knutson names several past 
location general managers who he heard were blind in one eye or 
otherwise not DOT certified.
In contrast, other Schwan's employees confirm that location 
general managers are required to drive trucks, for example "if 
[Schwan's] didn't have sufficient staffing on a given date to run 
all of the routes, generally the location general manager is 
responsible for making sure those routes get run. Not running a 
route was not acceptable." Evert Dep. 13:1-5. It is "not 
uncommon" for location general managers to drive trucks to run 
routes or train new employees, in fact it happens "frequently." 
Id. at 13:18-14:4; see Thompson Decl. 5 4.
Moreover, Knutson's employment offer states that it "is 
expressly conditioned on your meeting U S [sic] Department of 
Transportation and [Schwan's] standards for a ... physical
15
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examination." Knutson Dep. Ex. H, ECF No. 18-9. Further, the 
position description for a location general manager states as a 
qualification: "Must meet the Federal Department of Transportation 
eligibility requirements, including appropriate driver's license 
and corresponding medical certification as a condition of 
employment for this position." Id. Ex. 20. Therefore, the court 
finds that being DOT qualified to drive a delivery truck was an 
essential function of Knutson's job.
Knutson states that the unresolved injury meant that he would 
not pass a medical examiner's exam. Knutson Dep. 142:20-143:17. 
The injury triggered DOT regulations and Schwan's rules that he be 
"medically examined and certified" before the 24-month existing 
medical examiner's certificate expired. Knutson did not obtain a 
new medical examiner's certificate or a waiver and therefore, he 
could not perform the essential job function of being qualified to 
drive the delivery vehicles.
4. Reasonable Accommodations
Knutson next argues that Schwan's failed to accommodate him 
because it refused to allow him to continue working as a location 
general manager without driving. Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n 25. Knutson 
bears the initial burden "only to show that the requested 
accommodation is reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the 
run of cases." Peebles v. Potter, 354 F.3d 761, 768 (8th Cir.
2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Upon such
16
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a showing, Schwans must then "show special (typically 
case-specific) circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship in the 
particular circumstances." Id.
Reallocating "the marginal functions of a job" may be a 
reasonable accommodation; however, it is well settled that "[a]n 
employer need not reallocate or eliminate the essential functions 
of a job to accommodate a disabled employee." Dropinski, 298 F.3d 
at 710. In the present action, Knutson argues that eliminating the 
essential function of driving from his job is reasonable because, 
in the past, other location general managers retained their 
positions with visual impairments. Even if evidence of these 
alleged occurrences were not hearsay, they happened several years 
before Knutson's termination. The record shows that Schwan's 
changed its policy about DOT qualification at some point in 2004 or 
2005. See Evert Dep. 20:17-21:11. Review of the record shows that 
Knutson has not introduced admissible evidence of a non-DOT- 
qualified location general manager after the change in policy, and 
Knutson's argument fails. Therefore, summary judgment is also 
warranted based on Knutson's lack of qualification to perform an 
essential job function.
III. Breach of Contract
Knutson claims that Schwan's is contractually obligated to pay 
him "vacation pay, severance pay and mileage." Under Minnesota 
law, a breach of contract claim requires the plaintiff to establish
17
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formation of a contract, performance of conditions precedent and a 
breach. Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Minn. 
2011). In the present action, Knutson testified that there is no 
contract entitling him to "vacation pay, severance pay, and 
mileage." See Knutson Dep. 185:19-186:5. As a result, Knutson 
fails to provide evidence that a contract formed, and summary 
judgment is warranted.
IV. Minnesota Payment of Wages Act
Knutson also argues that he is entitled to vacation and 
severance pay, mileage and a 2008 bonus under Minnesota Statutes 
§ 181.13. When an employer discharges an employee, "the wages or 
commissions actually earned and unpaid at the time of the discharge 
are immediately due and payable upon demand of the employee." 
Minn. Stat. § 181.13. Section 181.13 "is a timing statute,
mandating not what an employer must pay a discharged employee, but 
when an employer must pay a discharged employee." Lee v. Fresenius 
Med. Care, Inc., 741 N.W.2d 117, 125 (Minn. 2007). Wages earned 
"are defined by the employment contract between the employer and 
the employee." Id. at 127.
Knutson acknowledges that he has no contractual right to 
"vacation pay, severance and mileage." As a result, those 
categories of compensation are not wages actually earned for 
purposes of section 181.13, and summary judgment is warranted as to 
vacation pay, severance and mileage.
18
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As to Knutson's bonus under the 2008 annual incentive plan, 
the plan states that location general managers are eligible if they 
are "an employee in good standing (i.e. in compliance with all 
applicable laws and company rules, regulations and policies) with 
[Schwan's] through the date payment is made." Knutson Dep. Ex. 10, 
at A00584. An exception exists for location general managers who 
suffer a "total disability as defined under the Schwan's long-term 
disability plan." Id. Knutson fails to provide the the definition 
of total disability from the plan, and admits that he never applied 
for or received short- or long-term disability. As a result,
Knutson fails to show that he had a total disability, and summary 
judgment is warranted as to the annual incentive plan.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 
motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 16] is granted.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: April 27, 2012
s/David S. Doty______________
David S. Doty, Judge 
United States District Court
19
